What Should We Expect from BRICS and What Should We Not?
来源:russiancouncil.ru;发表于:2024-03-27;人气指数:53
Wednesday, March
27, 2024
What Should We Expect from BRICS and
What Should We Not?
By Timofey Bordachev
Discrepancies between expectations and
practice are one of the most noticeable characteristics of modern world
politics, both in the performance of leading powers and in the activities of
the international institutions they create. The origin of this phenomenon is
the fact that the first is a product of subjective ideas or intentions, while
the second is the result of objective factors, which even the strongest
political will cannot cancel. Moreover, the expectations of the general public
often fall prey to its inertia in perception regarding the political process,
or the statements of political figures who themselves change plans, depending
on the dynamics of their capabilities.
In essence, this phenomenon of
international life does not represent a significant problem, because states
rarely lose anything; due to the fact that their practical policies do not
particularly correspond to our speculative constructions. However, we should
still not be blind to the fact that disappointment can have negative
consequences and, at the very least, reduce public enthusiasm for initiatives
which are considered important, but not successful enough in the short term. In
this regard, it would be wise to be clearer about what we can actually expect
from those initiatives that are considered important in the Russian foreign
policy system.
The BRICS group (Brazil, Russia, India,
China, South Africa) represents one of the most curious phenomena of modern
international politics. First of all, because this association of five
significant states, which was joined by several more participants on January 1,
2024, conceptually contradicts all ideas prevailing in the 20th century about
what an international organisation should be based on. In short, at the heart
of BRICS there is no visible possibility of the participating countries pooling
their economic and military resources. Even the permanent composition of the UN
Security Council is a relatively homogeneous group and consists of powers that,
with varying degrees of certainty, are recognized as victors in the last World
War and all, without exception, possess military resources that are
unattainably superior to those of other members of the international community.
What can we say about such strong and “established” institutions as NATO, the
G7 or the European Union? In the first case, we see a real unification of
military capabilities, in the second - economic power.
BRICS is not based on the balance of
power of the main participants, as was the case with the most successful
alliances of the past. Despite the fact that the Vienna Order, considered
super-successful, was a collusion of the strongest European powers over the
foundations of the legitimacy of the internal order in the countries they could
reach, it still contained the idea of a mutual balance of power. As a matter of
fact, the destruction of this balance as a result of the rapid strengthening of
Germany became the reason for the collapse of the entire Vienna system. In
BRICS it is nearly unthinkable that there could be one leader, like in NATO or
the G7, which would be able to discipline the other participants and achieve
jointly-set goals (these goals, formulated within the framework of the
“leadership” model of the institute, are achievable precisely because they
satisfy the interests of the leading country).
In other words, BRICS, amazing as it may
seem, is not a fake institution, a screen covering the basic mechanisms of
mutual understanding among its participants. This is precisely what poses the
greatest difficulty. Both in achieving jointly a set of tasks, and for its
understanding by outside observers, whose thinking is built within the
framework of a long-established canon. If the first issue can still, as we see,
be gradually overcome by the participating countries, then it is not yet
possible to solve the second problem. Perhaps it is not necessary. First of
all, because it would lead to the creation of a new template that begins to
generate completely meaningless expectations. In fact, we still have to,
firstly, assess the limits of cooperation between the BRICS countries in
dynamically changing conditions, and, secondly, create some kind of a framework
to assess the effectiveness of its activities.
Discussions about what BRICS can
actually do and what it can’t should begin with an understanding of how much
the achievements or failures of other international institutions are related to
their individual characteristics. The second may be a theoretical task, but it
makes clear what the BRICS will not do. The BRICS group, is essentially an
association of states that share a strategic vision of a fair world order, but
pursue their national interests in practical issues of global economics and
politics. Therefore, firstly, we cannot count on the BRICS group to create
international financial institutions and instruments comparable in scale of
influence to those controlled by the West - the International Monetary Fund or
the World Bank.
Secondly, one can hardly expect BRICS to
make decisions of a confrontational or repressive nature in relation to other
members of the international community. We understand, of course, that in their
current situation, Western countries perceive as confrontational any action or
decision that does not serve their specific interests. But if we ignore this
unfortunate fact, we must still understand that we should not think that BRICS
can become a “ram” for destroying the positions of the United States and Europe
in world affairs. Another thing: it is no coincidence that the Western powers
suspect everyone else of revolutionary or revisionist intentions; even
completely innocent actions become dangerous for the organism of Western
hegemony, given its current fragility.
The question, therefore, is only whether
the West can adapt to the inevitable reduction of its power over the main
global institutions and agendas. Therefore, there is no reason to try to
“pressure” our partners so that their actions become more destructive for the
West; they will play this role anyway. Thirdly, BRICS is unlikely to be ready
to solve, on a large scale, those problems of a global nature that the West
either cannot solve, or, within the framework of its selfish interests, does
not want to. However, BRICS will be able to create specific mechanisms for
addressing development problems (poverty, hunger, environmental degradation,
crime, terrorism, information security, artificial intelligence), which
represent an alternative to Western approaches and solutions. This in itself
will benefit global sustainability, but will also serve to help the West adapt
to new conditions.
And finally, one should not expect
achievements from the BRICS countries in those issues where their national
interests differ due to objective reasons, such as when they are linked to
their achievement of key development goals. BRICS was created and is expanding
in order to further strengthen the capabilities of its participants, but in no
case weaken them. We must be especially careful to assess the connection
between BRICS initiatives, as well as the potential consequences of their
implementation, and the specific interests of the member countries, including
Russia, in a variety of areas, from global security to private economic issues.
If we talk about BRICS’ practical
influence on global affairs, then it would be worth thinking in the direction
of several conditional criteria of effectiveness. Firstly, the degree to which
they correspond to Russia’s own interests, taking into account all the features
of our participation in the world economy and international politics. In other
words, to correlate what we want from BRICS with our own objective
capabilities. There is a reason to think that Russia is not the weakest member
of the BRICS group and, in this regard, its capabilities will also become
significant in achieving certain goals of the entire group. Secondly, the
ability of the participating countries to move forward within the framework of
the agenda that they were able to formalise when there were only five members
is important. Thirdly, the ability of BRICS to solve the problems of preserving
and strengthening those elements of globalisation that meet the interests of
its participants, but have been intensively destroyed by the West in recent
years, will be quite important.
Timofey Bordachev - Doctor of Science,
Programme Director of the Valdai Discussion Club; Academic supervisor of the
Center for Comprehensive European and International Studies, HSE University,
RIAC Member.
Valdai. Discussion club
Source: russiancouncil.ru